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Background: Two epidemiologically-unrelated clus-
ters of  Klebsiella pneumoniae  carbapenemase (KPC)-
producing  K. pneumoniae  were detected among 
several healthcare facilities (HCF) in Finland by routine 
surveillance using whole genome sequencing (WGS).
Aim: The objective was to investigate transmission 
chains to stop further spread of the responsible strain.
Methods: In this observational retrospective study, 
cases were defined as patients with  K. pneumo-
niae  KPC-3 sequence type (ST)512 strain detected in 
Finland from August 2013 to May 2018. Environmental 
specimens were obtained from surfaces, sinks and toi-
lets in affected wards. WGS was performed on K. pneu-
moniae  cultures using Illumina MiSeq platform and 
data were analysed using Ridom SeqShere software K. 
pneumoniae core genome multilocus sequence typing 
(cgMLST) scheme. Epidemiological information of the 
cases was provided by HCFs. Results: We identified 20 
cases in six HCFs: cluster 1 included 18 cases in five 
HCFs and cluster 2 two cases in one HCF. In cluster 1, 
a link with a foreign country was unclear, 6/18 cases 
without overlapping stay had occupied the same room 
in one of the five HCFs within > 3 years. In cluster 2, the 
index case was transferred from abroad, both cases 
occupied the same room 8 months apart. A strain iden-
tical to that of the two cases in cgMLST was isolated 
from the toilet of the room, suggesting a clonal origin.
Conclusions: The clusters were mostly related to case 
transfer between facilities and likely involved envi-
ronmental transmission. We show that CPE surveil-
lance using WGS and collaboration between hospitals 
are crucial to identify clusters and trace transmission 
chains.
Introduction
Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) 
pose a notable threat to patients and healthcare sys-
tems in Europe and globally [1-3]. Infections caused 
by CPE are associated with high mortality, primarily 
due to delays in administration of effective treatment 
and the limited availability of treatment options. CPE 
are predominantly hospital-acquired and carbapenem 
resistance is transmitted via clonal spread or hori-
zontal plasmid-mediated transmission [4,5]. Whole 
genome sequencing (WGS) has recently become the 
gold standard for bacterial typing and has previously 
shown to be useful to trace back transmission chains 
and reveal unexpected transmission routes within out-
breaks [6-9].
Inter-regional spread or an endemic situation of CPE 
was reported by 13 of 38 (34%) European countries in 
2015 [10]. Currently CPE are endemic in Greece, Italy 
and Turkey, posing a threat of cross-border spread dur-
ing international patient transfers [3]. CPE are rare in 
Finland and have been detected sporadically, mostly 
related to hospitalisation abroad [11]. Only one out-
break has been detected so far when nine patients 
were found colonised by  Klebsiella pneumoniae  car-
bapenemase (KPC)-producing K. pneumoniae  (KPC-KP) 
in a primary care hospital in Southern Finland in 2013 
[12].
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Here we describe how we traced back transmission 
chains in a single hospital cluster with two K. pneumo-
niae KPC-3 sequence type (ST)512 patients in Western 
Finland, and the first regional cluster with 18 K. pneu-
moniae KPC-3 ST512 patients in five healthcare facilities 
(HCF) in Northern Finland using WGS. We also report 
the results of patient screening and environmental 
investigations related to these clusters.
Methods
Population and surveillance
In Finland (population 5.5 million in 2018), publicly 
funded healthcare is organised in 20 geographically 
and administratively defined healthcare districts with 
a population range from 44,000 to 1.6 million inhabit-
ants. Secondary care is provided by 15 central hospi-
tals and five university hospitals additionally provide 
tertiary care services. Primary care is provided locally 
by public healthcare centres.
All Finnish clinical microbiological laboratories elec-
tronically notify all isolates with reduced susceptibil-
ity to carbapenems to the National Infectious Disease 
Registry and send bacterial strains to the Expert 
Microbiology Unit of the National Institute for Health 
and Welfare for confirmation and national surveil-
lance. Since 2015 all CPE strains have routinely been 
sequenced using WGS and older isolates (2009–14) 
have been sequenced retrospectively.
National guidelines for control of multidrug-
resistant bacteria
The national guidelines for controlling multidrug-
resistant (MDR) bacteria cover CPE [13]. According 
to the guidelines all high-risk patients (defined as 
patients who either were transferred from a foreign 
hospital or hospitalised abroad during the previous 
year) are placed in single rooms, managed by contact 
precautions like CPE-positive patients, and screened 
(twice 24 hours apart) for MDR bacteria at the time of 
admission. When CPE patients are newly identified, 
potentially exposed contact patients, such as current 
roommates, are screened and those exposed patients 
who are already discharged are flagged in the patient’s 
records to institute infection control measures and 
screening in case of re-admission. More extensive 
screening for CPE, like point prevalence surveys on 
wards or units, are considered if positive patients are 
found during the contact screening. When patients are 
transferred to other facilities, receiving facilities are 
informed about the patient’s infection or colonisation 
caused by CPE.
Case definition and epidemiological 
investigation
Based on WGS national surveillance analysis, cases 
were defined as patients with specimens dated 
from August 2013 onwards with a positive culture 
of  K. pneumoniae  KPC-3 ST512 belonging to one of 
two whole genome sequence clusters (GenBank 
accession numbers cluster 1 and 2: SAMN10791377 
and SAMN10791378, respectively) with 10 or less allele 
differences in core genome multilocus sequence typ-
ing (cgMLST) analysis. This cut-off was experimentally 
determined and has been used in similar studies previ-
ously [14]. National (public health microbiologists and 
epidemiologists) and regional (clinical microbiologists, 
infection control nurses and infectious disease special-
ists) experts formed the outbreak investigation team. 
Background information (hospital stay, ward specialty, 
underlying disease/condition, antimicrobial treatment, 
clinical outcome, hospital transfers, and travel his-
tory) of cases, and patient and environmental screen-
ing results were provided by the respective HCF (HCF A: 
615 beds; HCF B: 151 beds; HCF C: 113 beds; HCF D: 218 
beds; HCF E: 40 beds; HCF F: 779 beds). Data were ana-
lysed using descriptive statistics.
Patient and environmental microbiological 
testing
Environmental specimens (surfaces, sinks, toilets) 
were taken with sterile, cotton-tipped swabs. Patient 
and environmental specimens were plated on selective 
chromogenic KPC plates (CHROMagar, Paris, France) 
to screen for MDR Enterobacteriaceae. Isolates were 
characterised by matrix-assisted laser desorption/ioni-
sation time-of-flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spectrometry 
(VITEK MS, bioMeriéux, Marcy-L’Etoile, France), and 
antimicrobial susceptibilities were assessed by disk 
diffusion method according to clinical breakpoints as 
published by the European Committee on Antimicrobial 
Susceptibility Testing [15], or by gradient minimum 
inhibitory concentrations (MIC) determination test 
(Etest, bioMeriéux, Marcy-L’Etoile, France). The carbap-
enemase gene was determined by multiplex real-time 
PCR for isolates with reduced susceptibility to any car-
bapenem as per the national guideline [13,16].
Whole genome sequencing
WGS was implemented for all CPE positive strains. 
Sequencing was performed on a MiSeq instrument 
(Illumina, San Diego, California (CA), United States 
(US)). For the library preparation 1 ng purified DNA was 
used with a NexteraXT V2 DNA sample preparation kit 
(Illumina) and paired-end sequenced with a 2 × 150 bp 
kit (Illumina). Libraries were scaled to reach 100-fold 
coverage. Read mapping analysis was performed from 
the FASTQ files. Files were transferred to the Centre 
for Scientific Computing (CSC) environment where 
sequences were trimmed with Trimmomatic (version 
0.33), quality was verified with FastQC (version 0.11.6), 
resistance genes and multilocus sequence typing 
(MLST) were analysed with SRST2 version 0.2.0 [17,18]. 
Commercial software SeqSphere + (Ridom GmbH, 
Münster, Germany) and the available cgMLST scheme 
for  K. pneumoniae  from Ridom, were used to prepare 
the minimum spanning tree.
Ethical statement
The Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health deter-
mined that no ethics committee review was required for 
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Figure 1
Minimum spanning tree of core genome sequences of Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase-3 producing K. pneumoniae 
ST512 isolated from cases, Finland, 2013–2018 (n = 20 cases)
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this study since it was conducted as part of an investi-
gation in response to an acute public health problem. 
Collection of CPE strains is based on the communica-
ble disease law.
Results
Outbreak detection
Two separate clusters of closely related (less than 10 
allele difference) core genome sequences of  K. pneu-
moniae  KPC-3 ST512 were identified in a minimum 
spanning tree analysis of the national surveillance data 
(Figure 1). The first cluster included 18 cases distrib-
uted regionally over five HCFs (HCF A–E) in Northern 
Finland between August 2013 and May 2018 (Figure 
2  and  3). The second cluster included two cases in 
HCF F between July 2015 and April 2016. The causative 
strain of the first cluster was only susceptible to cef-
tazidime/avibactam, colistin and gentamicin and the 
strain of the second cluster to gentamicin and colistin 
(not tested to ceftazidime/avibactam).
Description of cases and transmission chains
The median age of the 20 cases was 69 years (range: 
30–89 years), 15 were male, and all but two had at 
least one underlying disease. Sixteen cases were 
found through positive results in clinical specimens 
(i.e. specimens requested by the attending physician 
due to clinical signs and symptoms of the patient) and 
four in routine or enhanced screening. Eight cases 
received antimicrobials for a clinical infection caused 
by  K. pneumoniae  KPC-3 ST512 and one patient died 
attributable to the infection. A summary of patient 
information is presented in the Table.
Cluster 1
The index case (case 1) of the first cluster was a patient 
with trauma and a drug abuse history. Recent travel 
history abroad was unclear. This case was treated in 
HCF A and detected positive by a clinical specimen in 
August 2013. Case 1 had previously been found nega-
tive during the same hospitalisation period when 
screened for MDR bacteria at intensive care unit (ICU) 
admission in July 2013 and also weekly according to the 
routines surveillance cultures of the ICU. Cases 2 and 3 
in HCF A were found by positive clinical specimens in 
September 2016 and December 2017 and had been 
treated 33 months and 50 months later in the same 
room as case 1 after the ICU care, respectively.
The strain spread to HCF B via case 4 who had had a 
preceding hospitalisation in HCF A in the same room, 
without overlapping stay, as case 1 and was subse-
quently transferred to HCF B. Case 4 remained positive 
for the outbreak strain for more than 2 years, but no 
further transmission was detected.
Case 5, the first one in HCF C, was identified by a posi-
tive clinical specimen in March 2015. No direct epide-
miological link between case 5 and any previous cases 
or HCF A was found. Case 6 in HCF C was identified by 
a positive clinical specimen 6 months after case 5 and 
likely obtained the strain via case 5 as they both were 
treated in ward X even though there was no overlap-
ping stay or common room. Cases 8, 9 and 10 in HCF C 
were identified by ward screening in November 2015. 
Case 8 likely obtained the strain via case 5 since both 
were treated in ward X with overlapping stay, though 
they did not share a common room. Based on the 
sequence analysis, cases 9 and/or 10 likely obtained 
the strain from case 8. Cases 9 and 10 had shared 
a room in ward Y, which had also been occupied by 
case 7 but without overlapping stay. Although case 7 
was identified by a positive clinical specimen four days 
before cases 8, 9 and 10, sequence analysis revealed 
that case 7 most likely obtained the strain via case 9 or 
10. Case 11 in HCF C was identified by a clinical speci-
men in February 2016 and had a strain with a sequence 
most likely derived from case 5, but no epidemiological 
link between these cases was found. Case 12 in HCF C 
was identified by a clinical specimen in April 2017 and 
had a strain with an identical sequence as case 5. Both 
cases (case 5 and 12) had attended weekly haemodi-
alysis in HCF C. Case 12 was previously found negative 
in the screening conducted after case 5 was found, but 
thereafter extended-spectrum beta lactamases (ESBL)-
producing bacteria were detected several times in 
clinical specimens before the detection of K. pneumo-
niae KPC-3 ST512.
The strain spread to HCF D by cases 13 and 14 who were 
identified by clinical specimens in October 2016 and 
January 2017 respectively. Both cases had stayed in 
Figure 2
Distribution over time of Klebsiella pneumoniae 
carbapenemase-3 producing K. pneumoniae ST512 cases, 
Finland, 2013–2018 (n = 20 cases)
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the same room as cases 1, 2, and 4 in HCF A (June 2016 
to September 2016 and October 2016, respectively) 
and were subsequently transferred to HCF D. Case 15 in 
HCF D was identified by a positive clinical specimen in 
July 2017 and most likely got the strain via case 13 in 
the same ward who occupied the same room but with-
out overlapping stay. Case 16 in HCF D was identified 
in May 2018. This case had a strain with an identical 
sequence as case 15, and a preceding hospitalisation 
in HCF D in the same ward and common room as case 15 
but without overlapping stay.
The strain was introduced to HCF E in June 2017 by 
case 17 (found by a positive clinical specimen) who had 
a strain with an identical sequence and had a preceding 
hospitalisation in HCF D in the same ward and in a com-
mon room as case 13 but without overlapping stay. 
Case 17 was subsequently transferred to HCF E. Case 18 
in HCF E was identified in February 2018 by a positive 
clinical specimen and obtained the strain in HCF E via 
case 17 in the same ward who occupied the same room 
but without overlapping stay.
The median time interval between the first positive 
specimens of all cases in cluster 1 was 3.0 months 
(range: 0–15 months).
Cluster 2
The second cluster consisted of two cases (case 19 
and 20) identified in HCF F with an identical sequence 
Figure 3
Epidemiological links between Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase-3 producing K. pneumoniae ST512 cases, Finland, 
2013–2018 (n = 20 cases)
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Table
Characteristics of cases with Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase-3 producing K. pneumoniae ST512 by healthcare facility 
and first positive specimen, Finland, 2013–2018 (n = 20 cases)
ID HCF Level of care
Ward 
specialty
Underlying disease/
condition
Month-year 
 
of 
specimen 
collection
Specimen 
 
type
Indication Epidemiological link
1 A Tertiary Surgery Trauma, drug abuse Aug-13 Abdominal fluid Clinical Unclear
2 A Tertiary Surgery Hypertension, CHD, carcinoma Sep-16 Liver surface Clinical
Common room in HCF A with case 1 
(no overlapping stay)
3 A Tertiary Surgery Pancreatitis Dec-17 Peritoneal secretion Clinical
Common room in HCF A with case 1 
and 2 (no overlapping stay)
4 B Secondary Surgery Cholecystitis
Jan-14, Blood Clinical
Preceding stay in HCF A and 
common room with case 1 (no 
overlapping stay)
Nov-14, Urine Clinical
Jul-15 Urine Clinical
Mar-16 Urine Clinical
5 C Secondary Internal medicine
Kidney 
transplantation, 
haemodialysis
Mar-15 Wound secretion Clinical Unknown link to HCF A
6 C Secondary Internal medicine RI, gout
Oct-15, Urine Clinical Same ward X in HCF C with case 5 
(no overlapping stay)Nov-15 Urine Screening
7 C Secondary Surgery Asthma, hypertonia Nov-15 Urine Clinical
Common room in ward Y in HCF C 
with case 9 and 10 (no overlapping 
stay)
8 C Secondary Intensive care
Kidney 
transplantation, 
DM, CI
Nov-15 Urine Screening Same ward X in HCF C with case 5 (overlapping stay)
9 C Secondary Surgery CHD, CI Nov-15 Faeces Screening
Common room in ward Y in HCF C 
with case 7 (no overlapping stay) 
and 10 (overlapping stay)
10 C Secondary Surgery Carcinoma Nov-15 Faeces Screening
Common room in ward Y in HCF C 
with case 7 (no overlapping stay) 
and 9 (overlapping stay)
11 C Secondary Surgery CI, dementia, hypertension Feb-16 Urine Clinical Unknown link to cases in HCF C
12 C Secondary Internal outpatient
Kidney 
transplantation, 
haemodialysis
Apr-17 Urine Clinical Weekly haemodialysis in HCF C with case 5
13 D Secondary Surgery Alcoholism, chronic pancreatitis, DM Oct-16 Urine Clinical
Preceding stay in HCF A and 
common room with cases 1, 2 and 4 
(no overlapping stay)
14 D Secondary Emergency room
Carcinoma, 
hypothyroidism, 
obesity
Jan-17 Urine Clinical
Preceding stay in HCF A and 
common room with case 1, 2 and 4 
(no overlapping stay)
15 D Secondary Surgery Diverticulosis, DM, hypertension Jul-17 Abscess Clinical
Common room in HCF D with case 13 
(no overlapping stay)
16 D Secondary Internal medicine CHD, COPD, RI May-18 Urine Clinical
Common room in HCF D with case 15 
(no overlapping stay)
17 E Primary General medicine
Carcinoma, COPD, 
DM, IC Jun-17 Urine Clinical
Preceding stay in HCF D and 
common room with case 13 (no 
overlapping stay)
18 E Primary General medicine
Obesity, recurrent 
erysipelas Feb-18 Urine Clinical
Common room in HCF E with case 17 
(no overlapping stay)
19 F Tertiary Cardiac surgery No Jul-15 Faeces Screening Hospital stay in Italy
20 F Tertiary Cardiac surgery
Necrotising 
fasciitis, empyema Apr-16 Wound Clinical
Common room in HCF F with case 19 
(no overlapping stay)
CHD: coronary heart disease; CI: cardiac insufficiency; COPD: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; DM: diabetes mellitus; HCF: healthcare 
facility; IC: insufficientia cordis; ID: identifier; RI: renal insufficiency; ST: sequence type.
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and with 12 allele differences compared with the near-
est strain of the regional cluster in Northern Finland 
(Table,  Figure 1,  2  and  3). Case 19 was transferred 
from an Italian hospital and found positive by routine 
screening, case 20 by a clinical specimen. Both cases 
occupied the same room more than 8 months apart.
Enhanced screening of patients and 
environment
After identification of the first case (case 5) in HCF C, 
17 specimens of nine potentially exposed patients were 
tested and all were negative. After identification of the 
second case in HCF C (case 6), around 200 potentially 
exposed patients were screened in November 2015 
and three new cases (case 8, 9 and 10) were found. 
The screening included discharged patients and two 
screening rounds in the haemodialysis unit and in one 
ward. Another ward was closed down for a week in 
December 2015 and 29 environmental specimens were 
subsequently taken, but all tested negative.
After detection of the third case in HCF D (case 15) 32 
potentially exposed patients were screened and 16 
environmental specimens were obtained in August 
2017, all patient and environmental specimens tested 
negative.
HCF E screened 29 patients after detection of their sec-
ond case (case 18) in March 2018 and obtained 46 envi-
ronmental specimens, but all tested negative.
HCF A screened 26 patients and obtained 16 environ-
mental specimens in March 2018 when the room occu-
pied by several cases (case 1, 2, 3, 4, 13 and 14) was 
identified. All specimens tested negative.
After identification of the second case in HCF F (case 20) 
in April 2016, 54 potentially exposed patients treated 
in the same room as case 19 and 20 were flagged 
and specimens could be obtained from 28 of them; 
all tested negative. The hospital staff also performed 
two cross-sectional screening rounds in the same ward 
(n = 32), and obtained 142 environmental specimens. 
Seven environmental specimens tested positive for  K. 
pneumoniae  KPC-3 ST512, and were either identical or 
showed maximum three alleles differences compared 
with the strains found in specimens obtained from 
cases 19 and 20 (data not shown). The first specimens 
were obtained after ordinary cleaning (no disinfectant) 
of the patient room. The positive sites were the patient 
desk, windowsill, floor drain, toilet seat, and inner toi-
let surface nearby the water edge. Contact isolation 
and cleaning (peracetic acid/hydrogen peroxide) were 
performed in the room. In the control specimens the 
inner toilet surface remained positive and the sink trap 
in the room was a new positive site. Terminal clean-
ing (peracetic acid/hydrogen peroxide) was performed 
after the patient discharge, also thereafter the inner 
toilet surface remained positive and the floor drain 
was again positive. The toilet remained positive even 
after treatment with NOCOSPRAY (OXY’PHARM, Paris, 
France) and with 1,000 ppm chlorine. Finally, it was 
negative after 2,000 ppm chlorine treatment and also 
in three control specimens (twice in May 2016 and once 
in March 2017).
Discussion
Here we describe two clusters of KPC-KP: one single 
hospital cluster with two cases and one regional cluster 
with 18 cases spread in five HCFs. Transfer of unknown 
carriers between HCFs and environmental contamina-
tion seemed to play a key role in KPC-KP transmission. 
The regional spread was initially not recognised due to 
transfer of previously unknown positive patients, long 
time intervals between successive cases, and distribu-
tion of cases in several HCFs.
The two clusters mainly affected acute care hospitals 
and most of the cases were detected by clinical speci-
mens. Extensive screening of potentially exposed con-
tact patients only identified a few new cases. Many 
of the patients were not only colonised by KPC-KP but 
had clinical infections, and one death was related to 
infection caused by KPC-KP. It also turned out that the 
disinfection control methods used previously were not 
effective in controlling the spread. The regional cluster 
is still ongoing in one HCF despite extensive measures 
including isolation of cases, screening, and enhanced 
environmental cleaning.
K. pneumoniae  ST258, and related strains like ST512 
with KPC carbapenemase gene as detected in this 
study, have caused healthcare-associated outbreaks 
globally since they were discovered in early 2000 and 
are considered to be endemic in HCFs in countries like 
China, Colombia, Greece, Israel, Italy, Puerto Rico, and 
the US [19,20]. In Finland, the first K. pneumoniae with 
KPC-2 gene was found in 2009 in a patient repatriated 
from Greece [21]. The first transfer of KPC-KP (ST258, 
KPC-2) between two patients in Finland was confirmed 
in 2009 (data not shown) and the first outbreak caused 
by KPC-KP (ST512, KPC-3) occurred in 2013 [12]. In the 
previous outbreak, no direct link to travel abroad or 
environmental contamination was detected. The out-
break was successfully controlled by rapid and exten-
sive screening together with cohorting and isolating 
carriers and exposed patients.
The core genome sequence analysis showed two dis-
tinct clusters with 12 allele differences, and we inter-
preted that both clusters were separate outbreaks. 
However, case 4 acquired 11 allele differences over the 
course of 2 years and 3 months, showing that analysis 
of WGS data using a strict cut-off needs to be comple-
mented with epidemiological data for correct interpre-
tation (as was done in this study). There was no patient 
transfer between HCFs of the two regions and the index 
case of the single hospital cluster was transferred from 
a hospital in Italy where KPC-KP is endemic. The origin 
of the regional cluster remained unknown. It is possi-
ble that undetected cases causing environmental con-
tamination have previously existed. Notably, the index 
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patient had negative surveillance cultures for MDR 
microbes before ward care during intensive care.
We found an epidemiological link (travel history, com-
mon ward or room) for most of the cases (16/20). It is 
likely that we missed cases since epidemiological links 
for four cases were not found. It is unknown how the 
strain was transmitted to HCF C since we could not find 
an epidemiological link between the first case (case 5) 
of HCF C and other HCFs. We know that three patients 
were transferred from HCF A to HCF C before case 5 
was detected. One of these three patients had shared 
a room with case 5, this might have caused transmis-
sion between facilities (data not shown). This could not 
be verified since the patient died before the screening 
was performed.
Only two cases with overlapping stays in a common 
room were found in these clusters, supporting our 
hypothesis of environmental contamination and sub-
sequent transmission to new cases. Outbreaks of  K. 
pneumoniae  with a persisting environmental reservoir 
and high resistance to cleaning efforts and as shown in 
HCF F in this study have been previously reported [7,22-
27]. Both cases of the single hospital cluster stayed in 
the same room more than 8 months apart, and the inan-
imate surfaces in the room and bathroom were found 
repeatedly positive, even after cleaning and decontam-
ination. Although we think that most of the environ-
mental contamination was caused by the second case 
since the specimens were taken after this case had 
stayed in the room, the long interval between the two 
cases and the efforts required for the decontamination 
suggest that the environment was the source of KPC-KP 
transmission. An alternative hypothesis could be that 
cases in this study did not obtain the strain from the 
environment, but directly from unknown carriers or 
indirectly via hands of healthcare workers.
Six cases could be linked to a common room in HCF A 
without overlapping stays within a period of 3 years and 
1 month. This suggests that environmental transmis-
sion might have been the main transmission route in 
the regional cluster as well. Environmental specimens 
were obtained twice from this room, 2 months after the 
last positive case and tested negative, which could be 
a sign that the room has now been decontaminated. 
We, however, recommend to keep monitoring the room 
to circumvent the risk of false negative test results.
Both clusters were recognised by national surveillance 
using WGS, and stress the relevance of national CPE 
surveillance. Multiple interventions are needed to con-
tain further spread. We could learn from Israel which 
has implemented and published a national strategy to 
contain a large outbreak of CPE [28]. Regional coordi-
nation needs to be implemented to actively monitor 
colonisation status of existing cases and trace-back 
transmission routes of new cases, especially when 
there is no link to hospitalisation abroad. Like our col-
leagues in Israel, we recommend that rooms occupied 
by CPE-positive patients be cleaned and disinfected 
once a day with dedicated, single-patient or single-use 
equipment [29]. Special attention should be paid to 
terminal cleaning following discharge, even to perform 
it twice by different teams and with different equip-
ment. This applies to all CPE-positive patients, not only 
in outbreaks and independently of the test results of 
environmental specimens (positive/negative). If there 
is no link to a foreign country, the trace-back period for 
epidemiological investigations should be long enough 
to ensure finding all links. Sometimes more than 1 year 
may be needed. Since the yield in screening potentially 
exposed contact patients has constantly been small, 
we consider starting systematic screening of patients 
discharged from affected wards as a new strategy. 
The regional outbreak team needs to be supported by 
real-time genomic sequencing by the national refer-
ence laboratory and a regular feedback communica-
tion mechanism to the HCFs is required to stop further 
transmission.
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